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Reflexivity, social transformation, and 
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Abstract 
This paper attempts to identify how reflexivity works within the local rationalities of 
social movement milieux that, it is argued, represent an important source of the 
development of reflexivity in contemporary lifeworlds. In interviews in the Dublin 
counter culture, reflexivity appears above all as the institutionalisation of autonomy, 
the creation of new social forms for self-determined purposes.  
A starting point is strategies of distancing from the taken-for-granted assumptions 
of individuals' lifeworld backgrounds, as well as participation in "mediated 
subcultures" enabling the use of knowledge of other lifeworlds to gain perspective. 
The flourishing of experiments and projects within the space thus opened up 
depends on a habitus foregrounding creativity rather than repetition. This is 
emphasised in everyday life by the value placed on development of the self, by the 
elaboration of purely verbal projects, by a fascination with form and "mind games", 
and by a delight in creative technical and practical activity. 
This also implies a structure of feeling that emphasises tolerance for different 
obsessions and orientations, a lack of identification with individual projects, 
organisations, or even the lifeworld itself, and thus a sense of the lifeworld as a 
provisional and open-ended project, valued primarily insofar as it is reflexive and 
creative rather than repetitive and "stagnant". Even its "stagnant" side, however, can 
be related to the active demands of a reflexive orientation to everyday life that 
privileges choice, creativity and explicit decisions and actions, and undermines or 
rejects the use of routine as an organising strategy for everyday action. 
At the same time, the apparent individualism of many of its activities created hides 
the thoroughly social genesis of these different "technologies of the self", in which 
cultural resources are mobilised in new social contexts to sustain and develop 
reflexivity. The key role of intellectual activity in the (re-)thinking and (re-
)organising of social life then connects this lifeworld to the more explicit political 
and cultural challenges that arise from it. 
In conclusion, the paper suggests the possibility of radicalising the concept of 
reflexivity beyond the reflexive consumption of social relations to their reflexive 
production. It argues that the stakes at play, within disorganised capitalism, are 
precisely those of the meaning of concepts such as "autonomy" and "reflexivity" 
within the opposing formations of the New Right and the counter-cultural left. 
 
Reflexivity, social transformation, and counter culture 
Introduction: the varieties of reflexivity (1)  
Contemporary social thought deploys the concept and "figure of thought" of 
reflexivity in a wide variety of often unclarified meanings. This paper attempts to 
examine what reflexivity appears to mean in practice within one particular, 
"counter cultural" lifeworld. To explain its relevance, I want to start by examining 
two ways in particular in which social phenomena can be described as reflexive. 
Reflexivity as universal human condition. This points to a micro-social condition of 
monitoring one's own actions, enabling the maintenance (sometimes the 
transformation) of social relations. This is a very old position in social thought; it is 
implicit in Weber's emphasis on the meaning of action, as well as in Freud's analysis 
of the superego as in a sense the internalisation of other people's perspectives on our 
action. Mead's symbolic interactionism and Goffman's work develop the sense of 
distancing from and monitoring of the social self. More recent work in 
ethnomethodology and the philosophy of language has refined these positions, and 
works such as Giddens (1993) and Habermas (1984) canonise this reflexive 
condition as fundamental to any social activity. 
Reflexivity as specifically modern phenomenon. At the same time, critical 
modernists (from Marx and Weber) claim that modernity sets free the potential of 
reflexivity in historically specific ways. In particular, "society" becomes both the 
(legitimate) subject and the (thinkable) object of rational (systematic and explicit) 
intervention. Reflexivity in this sense, then, is a (specifically modern) macro-social 
activity of intervention into "historicity" (the self-production of society), enabling in 
particular the transformation (sometimes the maintenance) of social relations. The 
institutions of modernity, in particular those of capitalism and the state, then 
represent the institutionalisation of reflexivity (Giddens 1990), however partial and 
restricted (Habermas 1987). In a sense, then, reflexivity in modernity can be 
identified with "social movements from above", and their "colonisation of the 
lifeworld". 
Social movements and the roots of lifeworld reflexivity 
Yet there is also a reflexivity from below, and of course social movements from 
below have themselves represented important interventions into society, as well as 
developing major bodies of theoretical knowledge of society. They have also been 
reflexive in other senses, if we consider the characteristic importance of 
organisational issues, theoretical disputes and (self-)education within social 
movements. 
In a paper to last year's conference, Paul Bagguley (1996) elaborated an interesting 
analysis of the relationship between reflexivity and social movements. If I 
understand him correctly, he argued that Giddens' concept of self-reflexivity, a 
reflexive approach to one's own activity, applies "to those who are relatively high in 
a hierarchy of power", such as senior managers restructuring a company (1996: 
11). Now while self-reflexivity may of course be restricted by direct domination - he 
considers "the example of the working class" - it is less clear how far this is true for 
the marginalised within the capitalist world-system, notably the "decommodified" 
(Offe 1985). 
It is also unclear that the example refers to self- reflexivity. It might, if the acting 
"self" were the company, and not the senior managers. Or, perhaps, if managerial or 
professional staff were restructuring, not the activities of the firm as a whole, but 
the way in which they work and communicate together. This would then not be a 
reflexivity of individual selves, or of a company, but rather the operations of a 
reflexive lifeworld, at least to a certain extent (one can be sure that profit and power 
would not be placed in question). The closest real-life example I can think of is the 
restructuration of higher education in the late 1960s and the 1970s. 
Such a lifeworld reflexivity has itself been attributed to social movements by a 
number of theorists; and this is the area I want to explore. More specifically, I want 
to examine the possibility that reflexivity as an aspect of habitus or local rationality 
rather than as a property of the social totality or the isolated individual has specific 
sources within the social movement milieux I am describing as counter cultures 
(Cox forthcoming).(2) 
Ten years ago, Lash and Urry identified a relationship between the "radical-
democratic ethos [...] shared by the various new social movements", the 
"destructured habitus" of the new middle classes and receptivity to postmodernist 
culture (1987: 285 - 300). More recently, Lash has used the concept of a "reflexive 
community" to describe, among other things, the core of the ecological movement. 
He writes: 
"These communities are reflexive in that: first, one is not born or 
'thrown', but 'throws oneself' into them; second, they may be widely 
stretched over 'abstract' space, and also perhaps over time; third, they 
consciously pose themselves the problem of their own creation, and 
constant re-invention far more than do traditional communities; 
fourth, their 'tools' and products tend to be not material ones but 
abstract and cultural." (Lash 1994: 161) 
Similarly, German research into "movement milieux" brings out the development of 
an "alternative" lifeworld, within which 
"To the manifold strivings for autonomy of the younger generation 
correspond for example extended demands for self-realisation at 
work, hedonistic leisure practices or new models of division of roles 
between partners. Noticeable is also their greater self-reflexivity, 
which enables conscious distancings from the 'incorporated' schemas 
of the habitus [of their parents' generation]." (Vester et al. 1993: 
204). 
Looking at the counter culture 
The concept of counter culture 
In a paper to the 1996 conference, I argued for the need for a concept of counter 
cultures that brings contemporary social movements together with their broader 
lifeworld context. Such counter cultures have their own local rationalities, and are 
not exhausted by the instrumental rationalities of organisation or commodification 
that may develop within them (Cox 1996). I am researching in particular a Dublin 
lifeworld, formed inter alia in London squats, Dublin crashpads, a college 
occupation and anti-nuclear and ecological organisations, which in turn forms a 
context for a variety of alternative "political" and "cultural" projects. The "local 
rationalities" of this lifeworld stress in particular reflexivity, which, I will argue, 
appears as a means of institutionalising and extending autonomy.(3) 
Local rationality: autonomy as self-development 
Last year I made a fairly simple case for the appearance of a logic of autonomy in 
this counter culture as explicitly prioritised against the sorts of instrumental 
rationality (in terms of political organisation and economic interests) that the "social 
movement" literature tends to ascribe to these settings. Here I want to sharpen the 
contrast (4). Instrumental rationality, it could be said, takes in a sense the self and 
its goal for granted, and asks what is the most effective means of getting from A to B. 
Possessive individualism, even in its hedonistic forms, takes a similar approach. The 
counter cultural logic of autonomy, however, starts from a concept of self-
development, within which the self is seen as open-ended; as something to be 
constructed or transformed. Thus participants make comments along the following 
lines: 
"Mick is ambitious within himself, it's himself that he wants to 
develop, not a career or any of that kind of stuff."(5) 
Another participant speaks of 
"People who do all kinds of odd and extremely innovative things, an 
awful lot of people whose top priority is sorting their head out, or 
whose top priority is something along the lines of enlightenment." 
The main theme here is that of moving away from the instrumental approach of 
seeking the best available employment towards an explorative approach to one's 
own life. This explorative sense is underlined by the relatively weak articulation of 
the nature of the alternatives and how to get there: this is not simply choosing an 
alternative strategy to achieve pre-existing goals. Rather, goals are something to be 
revised along the way. 
The similarity of this approach to the reflexive concept of the modernist "project of 
the self", and its dissimilarity from the romantic position normally imputed to these 
lifeworlds (which would imply a sense of a "true" self pre-existing social 
conventions (6)), is clear. There is a fairly straightforward reason for this: if one is 
not identifying with a fixed self (whether that be the given self of instrumentalism 
or the "true" self of romanticism), but rather treating the self as something to 
develop, this is itself a reflexive attitude. One distances oneself from "the self" in 
order to change it or observe it changing. Or, as Angela McRobbie puts it, 
"Different, youthful, subjectivities ... require and find in youth 
cultural forms strong symbolic structures through which 'who you 
are', 'who you want to be' and 'who you want to go out with' can be 
explored, not in any finalised way, but as an ongoing and reflective 
social process." (1994: 192). 
Reflexivity in the counter culture 
The counter cultural project of autonomy, then, is a reflexive one; and for its 
survival it demands an active reflexivity, in the sense of the creation of meanings 
and practices which defend the "free space" necessary for the project, enable this 
exploration, and develop the projects of the self as they move from the theoretical 
into the practical. This is then of course immediately political, in the sense of raising 
questions of power and control. 
This area of my research is still very much "in progress", so what I want to do here is 
simply indicate what seems to me a logical progression in terms of the development 
of this reflexivity, and illustrate it as well as I can from my research material. 
Strategies of distancing 
A logical prerequisite for any developed form of reflexivity is a certain measure of 
distancing from the "normal" and "taken-for-granted" assumptions of existing social 
and cultural relations. At its most basic, this is expressed in an attitude of wanting to 
find another path: 
"People [in the Dublin suburbs] seemed to be content with just kind of 
shambling along, and into secondary school and out the other side, 
into a job, and not losing touch with their friends in the pub every 
night of the weekend, but that wasn't enough for me. I was looking 
for something other and massively more, something to quench a 
deeper thirst for life. Like zombies, those people." 
This distancing operates in relation to the normal assumptions of people's class 
backgrounds: 
"Even before I went to college I went 'I want to do a sort of liberal arts 
thing that isn't going to qualify me for one thing, so I can't just be 
pushed into doing a HDip [teaching qualification]', and a lot of 
people said 'Oh, so you're going to be a teacher'. I said, 'No, I don't 
want to be a teacher.' I just wanted to leave Dublin for a while, do a 
lot of travelling, I'm grand." 
Most participants failed in one way or another to take the instrumental attitude to 
education demanded by conventional Irish assumptions about its role in providing 
secure employment. Similarly, many avoided the "obvious" strategy of taking the 
available opportunities in e.g. computers, translation or the music business. While 
this distancing from class assumptions is very general, there is also an ethnic 
distancing for a number of participants: 
"There are things you know, but they still have to be right in front of 
you to be obvious, like I always knew that the entire world wasn't 
white, Irish, all the rest of it, you know that all these other cultures 
exist, but it's when you actually meet them that it's different, because 
they live their whole life in a totally different perspective to you, 
which is great." 
Lastly, there is a distancing (for women at least) in relation to dominant gender 
assumptions: 
"You know, sometimes I wish 'Why'm I not like my sister?', you 
know? [laughs] Why do I make life so hard for myself? Why don't I 
just want a normal job, and a husband, and two kids, and a house, 
and two cars?"  
[LC: Well, why?] 
"I don't know why, I just don't. [laughs] I just find it immensely 
boring." 
As this last comment indicates, these are real choices that have to be made, and 
continually remade, within individuals' lives ("Why do I make life so hard for 
myself?"); but they are also made in relation to an alternative, counter cultural 
habitus ("I just find it immensely boring"). Distancing is not an easy exercise; and it 
depends crucially on the availability of alternative rationalities within which it 
makes personal and emotional sense. This very often also requires a physical 
distancing: 
"People go [to San Francisco] from all over the world. Usually people 
looking for something, or people who are too weird for the small 
town that they live in. I mean, people come from Ohio, the Midwest, 
and from places where they're just too freaky for where they live, or 
they can't handle how racist where they are is. A lot of people say 
they couldn't deal with how racist it is." 
Along with the usual forms of Irish emigration, this lifeworld also includes a 
number of people who have emigrated to Ireland (from Italy in particular), as well 
as a number of people who have returned from significant periods of time in the 
counter cultures of e.g. London, Paris or Berlin. A returnee comments: 
"So after I got back from there, I ended up in college, which was like 
being right back in secondary school again, which was about as far 
removed from where I'd been as I could have got at the time. So I 
wasn't very well acculturated, I kind of disacculturated myself 
somehow from all that kind of thing, I didn't relate to it very well. I'd 
lost all fear of loss of social prestige or position, all the subtle 
motivations for the middle-class Dublin life, they're all based on 
social position, standing and material comfort. All those kind of 
values I kind of shed [abroad]." 
Thus the reflexive (re-)creation of self often entails deliberate acts of distancing 
from one's lifeworld background. 
Other cultural possibilities 
One important element in making this distancing possible is participation in 
"mediated subcultures" which relativise the here-and-now by making present other 
cultural possibilities. These are rarely seen as something to be imitated verbatim; 
rather, they are used as a tool for opening up a sense of possibility with regard to 
one's own life - in other words, to enable reflexivity. Thus two participants describe 
the lifeworld in strikingly similar terms: 
"the fact that [those involved] are very well read and are involved in, 
interested in most things." 
and: 
"a whole bunch of people who were interested in the same kind of 
thing I was interested in, which is, I wouldn't say it was overtly self-
development, but at least interest in or awareness of self-knowledge 
and education." 
These are not just individual attributes, but relate to a shared habitus of (literally) 
reading other ways of life as a means of gaining distance from one's own 
background and of creating new possibilities: 
"They've taken on an awful lot of influences from popular culture and 
literature."  
[LC: But they've selected them.] 
"They've chosen the nice bits and thrown away the bits they don't like. 
It's I think not entirely insignificant that there's a large library of 
material that virtually everybody in that group has read [...] like Fear 
and Loathing, and what you said about that book about the [New] 
Travellers (7), which has been snapped up like gold dust." 
Another participant shows this as linked to lifeworld practices of circulating 
relevant books: 
"People kept throwing books at me, which was quite good too. I read 
a lot that summer [...] Things like The Great Shark Hunt, Generation 
of Swine, The Electric Kool-Aid Acid Test (8), a whole pile of Kerouac 
books, Carlos Castaneda, LSD and the American Dream (9) [...] So I 
just picked out the ones I liked [...] Bob lent me a whole pile of books 
[...], and I just picked out the ones I liked the look of." 
The main interests, then include other ways of life, whether contemporary, semi-
mythical or historical. Thus the American counter culture of the Sixties is critically 
examined as a sort of map of the territory: 
"So then they'd started, you know, they started exploring alternatives, 
and as always happens with that a lot of people just spent a lot of 
time doing a lot of drugs, wandering round, getting fucked up, and 
trying to be enlightened. And of course a lot of them weren't 
enlightened, a lot of them ended up doing heroin, but a couple were, 
so it was well worth trying." 
A similarly critical approach is shown by another participant: 
"I read occult books voraciously for a couple of years, and whilst I 
never put very much of that into practice, holding back I suppose, not 
wanting to rush into anything, but also there was sensations of there 
being something missing. It was like vouchers, all these different self-
development systems, they promise great things, but there was very 
little evidence of people actually having achieved anything with it. I 
suppose I was looking for the tracks of fellow travellers who'd gone 
before." 
Other ways of life, then, are not imitated but rather used as a means of setting 
provisional goals, for personal development and for lifeworld mobility. Thus one 
participant uses the American Sixties as a reference point for finding a reflexive 
lifeworld: 
"I suppose I had this idea in my head of coming across a kind of 
Merry Prankster-ish bunch of people who were interested in 
bouncing off each other as much as they could, rather than going to 
the pub." 
Thus there is a move from the second-hand bookshop to practical physical 
exploration of other ways of life: 
"I was interested in the occult at the time, I was interested in neo-
paganism, and I wanted to met people who were into that kind of 
stuff, also buskers, musicians. I was interested in what people were 
doing in Dublin who weren't in college. You know, people who were 
just sitting in their flats, painting or writing. I think the way I looked 
at it at the time was, I wanted to know bohemians." 
Once again, though, the point of mobility between lifeworlds is not to identify with 
a new lifeworld, but rather to use the variety of different rationalities as a building 
block for the construction of one's own life: 
"What I wanted to do ideally was be able to wander round and travel 
anywhere and deal with whatever I came across. That was it, more or 
less, just meet people from everywhere, I suppose get as many 
perspectives as possible, that's what I really wanted. Reality tunnels, I 
think Robert Anton Wilson said." 
This quote neatly encapsulates the relationship between the mediated subculture, 
the practical activity and the reflexive intention of gaining different perspectives. 
The net effect is to open up a sense of possibility, which can then be translated into 
action: 
"I might think, 'Oh, I'd really like to, say, learn guitar and busk my 
way round the world', but if I had never seen anybody do it I 
wouldn't do that. I mean, I know people who've done it, and I know 
people who've gone to India, so I go 'OK, it's perfectly feasible to just 
go to India and stay there for six months.' And that was really good. 
And when you meet one person like that you start meeting more and 
more of them, and when you find people who've spent years 
wandering round the globe, and you go, 'Yeah, I do want to do that, 
and yeah, they can do it. It's perfectly feasible.' And it's a perfectly 
viable alternative to having an excellent career." 
A reflexive habitus: experiment, creativity and form 
Reflexivity, then, involves a certain distancing from customary expectations and a 
greater awareness of alternative possibilities. It also involves, if it is taken to its 
logical conclusion, making some use of these: rather than reproducing existing 
social relations (albeit with an "ironic" awareness of their contingency), 
experimenting with alternatives. 
I don't want to get into the nature of these alternatives in detail here. In this 
particular lifeworld, they appear in particular as a series of projects and 
experiments. To list some examples, in no particular order: 
* Political projects, such as anarchist and green groups, street theatre, 
student politics, direct action, etc.; 
* Experimentation with living forms, in particular shared houses, squats and 
"crashpads"; 
* Economic experiments, such as coops, alternative bookshops, LETS systems, 
etc.; 
* Experimentation with sexual relationships, including bisexual, open and 
multiple relationships; 
* Experimentation with drugs, in particular hash, acid and mushrooms; 
* Cultural experiments, such as alternative music, board and roleplaying 
games, Rainbow Gatherings, pagan and occultist rituals and groups, etc. 
Some of these projects are relatively successful, for a variety of internal and external 
reasons; others are stillborn or die rapidly. I am interested here in the cultural 
habitus, in the sense of a general orientation to the world, that enables this 
experimentation, that makes it possible to "try out" the implications of reflexivity. 
The best way of summarising this is seems to be in terms of a general valuation of 
creativity and "makeability". A starting point for this is of course the logic of 
autonomy I have referred to earlier, where the focus is not on instrumental action to 
get the best results in predefined terms, but where the self is itself seen as a kind of 
project: 
"It comes back to this idea that the way in which people perceive 
ambition as not a material ambition, which again links back to the 
ideas about people's property and that. While they have fuck all of it, 
I don't think that is entirely responsible for their attitude. The 
development is sort of personal development, it's not material 
development. So the idea of going away to make money isn't really, 
you're not going to impress anybody, really. 'Oh wow, he's earning 
fuckloads of money, good for him, so what?' " 
Thus reflexivity neatly links back to the logic of autonomy as self-development: the 
creative and experimental attitude applies to the self as much as to the external 
world. I will come back to some of the implications of this later. 
One way in which this habitus appears is in a fascination with form. This is of 
course a very visible feature of contemporary social movements, where the effort 
devoted to formulating and implementing an organisational form will often exceed 
the effort devoted to its ostensible purpose. Alberto Melucci, for example, has 
written that 
"The self-reflective form of action is another specific feature of the 
emerging collective phenomena. Action is a message sent to the rest 
of society, which speaks through its own forms and with a high 
degree of self-reflexivity. Organisational forms, patterns of inter-
personal relationships and decision-making processes are themselves 
meaningful signs addressed to the society as a whole. But they are 
also a goal in themselves: actors consciously practice in the present 
the objective they pursue." (1995: 113 - 114) 
Here I am interested in how this reflexive focus on forms operates in people's lives 
when they are not actively creating something new. One manifestation is the 
constant creation of purely verbal projects - the extensive development of elaborate 
schemes which are never intended to be acted upon. The enjoyment is again simply 
in the playing with form and ideas. A typical example: 
"Bob had this plan, where you know he wanted to do this, set up a 
retirement fund, basically, which would pay for a retirement home 
for old druggies [laughter], free, like, to all of the people we know 
basically, for your dope-heads, you know, and, who'd like to be 
wrecked off their heads for their latter days, when they can't move 
any more, you know, and they're bedridden, so [laughter] I think if 
Martin makes a million he'll probably build that you know." 
Another participant describes this attitude as follows: 
"[I liked] anything that would just stimulate your brain a little. I 
mean, even if you just sit down and plan something completely 
bizarre, plan it from start to finish, even if you never do it, if you plan 
it flawlessly, it's like Bob used to do. Bob would plan something 
through flawlessly, and it would never happen. And then he'd plan 
something else flawlessly. And after you knew him for a while you'd 
think 'Well, it doesn't matter that he doesn't do it, cause that's not 
what he wants, he gets a kick out of just planning it." 
Something similar is expressed in the enjoyment of formalistic "mind games" - the 
interest in things such as the nature of consciousness and artificial intelligence, 
theoretical physics and mathematics, the more elaborate brand of conspiracy theory 
and alternative reality books and the psychological "mind games" of e.g. Zen and 
Sufi stories. 
"What I was interested in was ideas. [...] And I was reading about a lot 
of different ways of viewing the world, the different ways of viewing 
the inside of your own head." 
Another participant said: 
"I was going a little crazy one afternoon and wrote a long, very 
rambling email to somebody and got a mail back, 'Oh, I see you're 
pretending you're mad just in case people realise that if you don't 
pretend you're mad, you might actually be mad!' [laughter] Yeah, 
there is an element of that. There's certainly an awful lot of mind 
games go on, but everybody does it for fun." 
A final symbolisation of this valuation of creativity is the fascination with elegant 
and baroque technical solutions to what are very often non-problems. If play is a 
means of flexing particular kinds of muscles, this is another way of maintaining a 
creative orientation to the world. An off the cuff discussion sparked off by the 
interview microphone falling down: 
"Mick'd probably build something [...] Can you, can you get into the 
attic and drill a hole and [laughter] Boom mike from three empty 
yoghurt cartons [laughter] A man who builds heart-lung machines 
from empty yoghurt cartons." 
This "techie trip" is an attitude of play and appreciation rather than of immediate 
usefulness: 
"With me it's just a fascination with anything clever. Somebody comes 
up with a solution to a problem that is clever, I will admire it." 
Clever solutions and creative play with forms: these are modes of leisure of a 
reflexive lifeworld. 
Tolerance and lack of commitment 
A corollary of this experimental and playful attitude is a combination of tolerance 
and lack of commitment. The world is seen as in a sense a series of not entirely 
binding projects and attempts at "getting things together", with a generalised 
expectation that different people will be "into" different projects at different times. 
Tolerance of these different experiments is thus a natural virtue, as one participant 
observes: 
"I think the fact that these people have the laid-back attitude of 
allowing people to do their own thing is a mechanism which allows 
very strong personalities and very strong individuals to be able to 
interact with each other without stomping on each other's toes, and 
the sorts of ambitions that those people have, and the way in which 
they allow that ambition to be fulfilled, doesn't involve getting a 
group of people to centre round you." 
This attitude enables not just coexistence with other people's reflexive projects, but 
also appreciation of them and drawing on them: 
"Magnus had all kinds of odd obsessions, but he was also very into 
some things and he was right about some things too." 
Related to this tolerance of each other's experiments is a refusal of commitment to 
them: 
"Most people I know don't want to be committed to anything. Or 
anybody, because they're so desperate to get their lives together, get 
whatever it is that they want to do together that that takes up an 
awful lot of time, so they don't want to compromise that by being 
stuck in one place or one job or with one person or in one country." 
In other words, "getting it together" - creative and reflexive activity - is potentially 
threatened by too great a degree of commitment to any specific project. The breadth 
of areas that this applies to in the comment just quoted is echoed by another 
participant: 
"It wasn't a sort of a group with any specific aim, like. Except having 
fun, and being yourself, or doing your own thing, or whatever you 
wanna call it [...] At the moment I don't think it amounts to very 
much except [laughs] an excuse for doing exactly what you want, 
when you want, not caring about anybody else."  
[LC: Does it get in the way of other people?] 
"No, I wouldn't put it that way, as getting in the way of other people, 
but you don't put yourself out. I mean, I'm not saying that nobody 
ever does, you know what I mean, but you don't, they're, like I mean, 
people that can be and are very nice and help and this kind of thing, 
you know, but I think all this thing about doing your own thing loads 
of times was basically 'I don't want to commit myself to anything' " It's 
used very much for breaking up with somebody. You wanna be free." 
[LC: And you don't think that was sincere?] 
"It probably was at the time. I'm sure it was. I mean, I've used it 
myself." 
I will return to the difficulties caused by this attitude later. For the moment, I want 
to point to the logical conclusion of this: it is normal for participants to see the 
counter culture as something that is ultimately provisional and external. Rather 
than re-identifying with the new lifeworld, the reflexive attitude is maintained. As 
one participant comments: 
"It's kind of paradoxical to want to be part of a group and at the same 
time not yet part of the group. To want to create a comfortable subset 
or define its boundary or something." 
The lifeworld, then, is legitimated by its contribution to reflexive projects, and if it 
moves towards becoming "taken-for-granted" in its turn it needs to be ditched, and 
for the same reason it was initially entered. Thus it is always an open-ended 
exercise: too tight an articulation would defeat the purpose. The fascination with 
experimentation and the double-edged tolerance and refusal of commitment are 
ways of structuring interaction within this "free space", the skills of living together 
in a particular way (10). This may be formalised at times in particular institutions, 
but exists primarily as a way of doing things, a common "structure of feeling" 
geared towards reflexivity. 
The paradox is underlined by the fact that virtually all participants have spent 
considerable periods of time outside Ireland. One participant says of his decision to 
emigrate: 
"The advantage of [being abroad] is you're not stuck in a certain 
context. You can't say 'I can't do this, because everybody who knows 
me knows, and I'm not the sort of person who does this." 
And another: 
"[The difference new people make is] new influences, new ideas. If I 
can be excused using a sort of Americanism clichpersonal 
development, in the sense that my interaction with these people, 
whilst it is completely wrong to suppose that I can't get anything 
more out of interacting with these people, I had got caught in a rut, 
where my relationship with them was such that something had to 
change before I could get more out of my interaction with these 
people. That something needed to be other people bringing new 
attitudes, new ideas, fresh outlook on old ideas, anything, into it, 
would have possibly changed that and sort of got me out of that rut." 
Thus if life-world reflexivity and self-reflexivity are blocked, "creativity" turns to 
"stagnation". But I want to argue that there are also other reasons why "creativity" is 
likely to generate "stagnation". 
The paradoxes of everyday reflexivity 
Lifeworld reflexivity implies that all activity, not only work processes or political 
organisation, require clear reasons and articulate decisions. Giddens (1994) has 
recently explored the pathological effects of the impact of reflexivity "from outside" 
on lifeworld contexts in the generation of compulsive and obsessional activity. What 
I am researching here, however, is a lifeworld where the demand for reflexivity 
comes very much "from within". 
It is something of a sociological commonplace (e.g. Berger and Luckmann 1967) 
that routine, convention, tradition, ritual and so on are enabling mechanisms: they 
enable the regular production of action without much need for prior thought and 
discussion, they enable a sedimentation of "how-to-do-it" knowledge and skill, and 
so on. For the same reason, of course, they privilege means rather than ends, 
exclude the operation of reason, reinforce local power structures, and prevent the 
exploration of new possibilities. Yet consider the implications of this critique. 
If a reflexive orientation to the lifeworld demands a focus on ends and the 
elaboration and coordination of reasons for action, democratic agreement on the 
forms of activity, and the exploration of all the possibilities that can be imagined or 
read about by the educated and computer-literate in western societies in the 1990s, 
this makes activity of any kind an extremely demanding business. 
The interest in other ways of life and other ways of thinking about the world, the 
fascination with form and technique, the interest in talking about impossible 
projects and so on then acquire another, immediately practical meaning, as ways of 
discovering problems in play and talk rather than in action and conflict. As one 
participant puts it: 
"It does help you if you've got a slight idea about something but it's 
vague, and you're really not that sure, and then you'll be sitting in a 
room with somebody who'll be talking about it and you'll go 'Yeah, 
that's it, that's exactly what I was looking for. Where is that?' Or 
'What book was that in?' And they can tell you. [...] From that point of 
view, yeah. If you find somebody who's already done what it is that 
you're about to do you can get a lot of advice from them. You can get 
some pitfalls, as well. It's like 'I did this for ten years, and it's not 
worth it. Try something else instead.' " 
At the same time, the stakes are very high in contexts where neither the nature of 
the self, nor its goals, can be taken for granted, and people are prepared to 
deliberately disqualify themselves from conventional employment, to live on the 
streets abroad, to emigrate to another hemisphere and so on. Where reflexivity 
widens the range of actual options to include all possible choices, with no fixed 
yardstick to evaluate these possibilities and their consequences, choice becomes 
difficult, if not impossible. Choosing itself becomes an almost impossibly high 
barrier: 
"If you do have that amount of choice, if you sit down, like for 
instance, at the moment I'm in completely the ideal situation, because 
[...] I've got no ties whatsoever, I don't have to be back in Dublin for 
anything, I don't have to come back for a course, I don't have to come 
back for a job, I've got a job where I don't have a contract. I could 
leave tomorrow [...] my only limitations are money, that's the only 
thing. There's nothing else. Which is great. But it also means 'Oh no, 
what should I do next?' Cause if you can do anything at all, it's 
difficult to narrow it down." 
Or, as another participant says, 
"I could get a job now, if I decided to, that I want [a professional job]. 
That's what I mean about getting it together [...]"  
[LC: So what would the kind of job be that you want?] 
"Well, if I knew the kind of job I wanted, Laurence! [laughs]" 
Given the costs of reflexive action, then, it is hardly surprising that life in this 
counter culture alternates between bursts of enthusiastic activity and new projects 
which do fit the bill of reflexive creativity, and lengthy stretches of "null-space", of 
talk and play, of understructured inactivity. EP Thompson (1993) argued that an 
alternation of intensive activity and relative inactivity was normal prior to the 
imposition of industrial labour discipline; its reflexive variant, however, carries with 
it an alternation between elation and depression that was presumably foreign to the 
annual agricultural cycle. One factor behind the emigration of many participants 
was precisely a desire to redress the balance between this "stagnation" and the 
"creativity" that they sought: 
"The people who have come back have all changed quite a lot as a 
result of their experiences. More than anything else, I think they've 
got themselves together quite a lot [...] They're much more together, 
they get jobs, they hold them down, and they get their act together. 
And that has a significant influence." 
This is also true even of those who have remained, in that they have made use of 
external structuration to keep the possibility of creative activity open: 
"He now has himself, at the moment he's still officially temporarily 
employed by [a removals firm], which he has said himself is doing 
him an absolute world of good in that there is a degree of externally 
imposed discipline which has a knock-on effect in that he's able to 
achieve whatever the hell he wants to do, he values his spare time, he 
uses it efficiently, he gets things done, whereas previously he had so 
much bloody time to do anything he achieved nothing." 
For those who do overcome the barriers of action on a regular rather than sporadic 
basis, this is achieved at a very high cost, that of forcing themselves into action, 
choice and commitment by placing themselves under extreme moral pressure. The 
levels of burnout among such activists are then very high, since the amount that 
needs doing is effectively infinite once reflexivity is applied to one's political 
persona, and because reflexive modes of organising are not just extremely labour-
intensive but also extremely emotional, since they place one's own personal project 
continually in question and depend on self-exploitation and the mining of this very 
insecurity (Cox 1997). 
The social technologies of the self 
Reflexivity, then, is not easy to live with. It might be impossible to maintain without 
the social creation and deployment of "technologies of the self" which enable its 
institutionalisation at the heart of the lifeworld. In this section I want to examine 
some elements of this. One is a straightforward sharing of interests in activities that 
can enable an exploration, not just of form, but also of interaction and inner 
experience: 
"A lot of them have a background in either computers or roleplaying 
games, fantasy novels, science fiction, music, they all play guitar, and 
they listen to the same kind of music, maybe books as well." 
Thus for example: 
"Music is definitely a very strong, it's a binding force among 
everybody. Those that don't actually play themselves are certainly into 
hearing it [...] So the fact that certain people are musicians after a 
fashion and others aren't isn't exclusive. The music thing is not 
exclusive to those that do actually perform." 
So music is used to structure interaction, and in specific forms: the emphasis is on 
"sessions" of creation, improvisation and interactivity. Such sessions are themselves a 
form of reflexive interaction, but they are also organised around a particular type of 
music: 
"It was a lot of the kind of music I liked, I mean, there's a lot of sort of 
ballady stuff and folk stuff, and then there was your kind of John 
Martyn, Tom Waites, that kind of thing [...] But that is always all part 
of it, I mean, the music is very much part of it." 
In other words, the type of music involved - apart from technically lending itself to 
impromptu sessions - is relatively verbal, often quasi-literary, music, focussed 
primarily on exploring the subtleties and uncertainties of personal interaction and 
inner experience. 
Something similar appears in the case of drug use: the drugs preferred are 
themselves suited to a reflexive approach to interaction and to the self, and they are 
taken with very specific orientations: 
"The people over there do smoke, as much as people over here [in 
Dublin], and yet the attitude and the lifestyle is quite different. They 
are still a very tolerant group of people, but the attitude is quite 
different, so I would definitely refute the idea that the use of drugs is 
a significant factor for the way in which these people behave." 
Or again: 
"Other people [in London] would go on doing acid and going to 
raves, and sort of going out into the city at night, but I tended to do it 
on my own, all night and watch the dawn. And I continued on going 
into myself until I kind of got to the point of ego death and rebirth." 
Contextualising reflexive practices 
These apparently isolating activities in fact imply a whole social context. In each 
case a social body of knowledge is entailed: chords for songs are exchanged, and 
shared books and "folk science" discussions orient expectations and techniques in 
drug use. Music is created in sessions, and drugs are often if not always taken 
together. Similarly, books are borrowed, tapes copied, and drugs circulated through 
the network. All of this depends on a very specific mode of lifeworld organisation: 
"There's a very laid back attitude to property. People are not 
particularly possessive or protective of what is their property, you 
know, people borrow things from, there's an awful lot of kipple that 
transfers and ends up in various flats. It's not uncommon to arrive in 
somebody's flat, 'Oh, can I have a look through your tapes?' - 'Yeah, 
sure, go for it.' - 'Oh fuck, that's mine, where'd you get that?' - 'I 
dunno, oh, take it back.' - 'Oh yeah, well haven't seen that in years'. 
You know, people don't get wound up about it, they just 'Ah shit, I 
haven't seen that, I was wondering where it went' " 
In other words, the technologies of the self depend on specific local rationalities, as 
another participant stresses: 
"The only philosophy I thought that was behind all that group of 
people was, you know this thing, 'What goes around comes around', 
you know, the idea of like, at a simple level, somebody bums a 
cigarette off you, you bum a cigarette off somebody else? This kind of 
thing, at a really low level, but it's true, what goes around comes 
around. You do things for people, the idea is, instead of, I was 
brought up with a favours system, you know, I do this for you 
therefore you have to do this for me. Somebody gives you a Christmas 
present, you're morally obliged to give them one, this kind of thing, 
whereas I just liked that, you know, that people would do things for 
other people for no apparent reason. It's like, I have something that I 
don't need. You need it, take it." 
Such local rationalities are created in appropriate contexts. Thus one participant 
comments of a college occupation that it set 
"a framework of the way in which the social interactions that that 
particular group of people have subsequently continued to use: a lot 
of music, people sitting round playing music, talking, often about 
trivia, but there have often been, you know, good serious discussions 
as well". 
These "good serious discussions" are of course fundamental technologies for the 
institutionalisation of a reflexive attitude towards the self and the lifeworld, and 
more indirect forms are possible. Another participant in the same occupation says: 
"I got into tarot cards and palmreading and stuff like that, you know 
just kind of basic psychology sessions, like sitting down and just kind 
of trying to sort each other's problems out, that kind of thing." 
There may be limits to the effectiveness of such interaction, as one participant 
comments: 
"Well, ultimately you have to do it yourself. You know, people can sit 
you down and say 'you're this sort of person and that means this is 
what you should be doing'. You'll say 'yeah, yeah, I know, you're 
absolutely right' but till you get to that point you're still not going to 
do it. But yeah, people can help people. To a certain extent. You can 
say, you can help them along." 
Yet the net effect of this cooperation with each other's projects of autonomy is a 
reflexive lifeworld built on strong personal links: 
"I think it was like a support group. It was one of the closest groups of 
people I ever came across. I hadn't come across groups of people who 
knew each other that well and were that close, which was really nice. 
Knew everything about each other, had been through lots together." 
These socially organised practices, then, enable an apparently individualistic mode 
of life to continue its separate existence rather than submerge back into the 
mainstream. There seems to be a close relationship between individuals' continued 
involvement in such practices and the networks that sustain them, and their 
continued development of personal and lifeworld reflexivity. 
Reflexive lifeworlds and intellectual activity 
Clearly, the kinds of interaction I have described depend partly on access to 
culturally valuable resources (obscure books and music, drugs, tarot cards and so 
on). They also depend, naturally, on developing appropriate means for 
communication and organisation within a very transient population and a city of a 
million people. Most importantly, perhaps, they rely on the creation and sharing of 
skills and knowledge: 
"I think it was like a mutual support group, cause if you are a certain 
kind of person and you meet other kinds of people like you, you go 
'Great, there are other people in the world like me' and you can 
discuss the things together and come to conclusions that you mightn't 
have otherwise, and somebody will know something you don't, and 
you'll know something they don't, and you can exchange information 
and stuff." 
The intellectual organisation of social movement milieux is discussed in similar 
terms by Eyerman and Jamison: 
"A social movement is not one organisation or one special interest 
group. It is more like a cognitive territory, a new conceptual space 
that is filled by a dynamic interaction between different groups and 
organisations [...] It is precisely in the creation, articulation, 
formulation of new thoughts and ideas - new knowledge - that a 
social movement defines itself in society." (1991: 55) 
Hilary Wainwright's discussion emphasises the reflexive nature of such activity: 
"The extraordinary political energy of [the late sixties] demonstrated 
in a concentrated way the power that people potentially have to 
dissolve constraining structures which in 'normal life' they passively 
reproduce. It encouraged a reliance on self-organisation and direct 
action, and with this a pooling of their own knowledge, extension of 
it by direct contact with potential allies with different vantage points, 
rather than acceptance of an acknowledged authority." (Wainwright 
1995: 75) 
This grassroots intellectual activity of rethinking and reorganising everyday life 
links, as she writes for the women's movement, "transformation of self and 
transformation of social structures" (1995: 79). In her argument, it forms a 
fundamental resource for social change. 
Conclusion: radicalising reflexivity 
From this point, it becomes possible to criticise the limited nature of contemporary 
notions of reflexivity. If the reflexive attitude has a general value as a presupposition 
of communicative action, yet it is deformed in the normal run of things by the 
colonisation of the lifeworld by the agencies of capital and power (Habermas 1984, 
1987). Thus we arrive at a situation where social relations are commonly 
"consumed" reflexively, but "produced" unreflexively. In other words, there is a 
diversity of "negotiated" readings, which in another perspective is a precondition for 
effective cultural hegemony - the ability of the dominated to find their own value in 
the cultural construction of their own domination (Gramsci 1991: 12 - 14). The 
counter culture then offers the possibility of a radicalisation of this notion of 
reflexivity, within which we do not simply monitor "how we are doing" or adopt 
various attitudes towards our own action, but rather (attempt to) change the way in 
which we construct our selves, our actions and our lifeworlds. 
Within the cultural politics of post-1968 western states, the challenge to the 
previous "taken-for-granted" modes of cultural domination has led to a "reflexive" 
shift which makes "business as usual" possible once again, now with an ironic air, or 
perhaps a conventionalist legitimation. If Touraine (1981) is right that the struggle 
between social actors is what constructs the stakes of "historicity", then there has 
been a shift from a "hegemony of closure" (within which the centrality of the 
conflict between the dominant "old right" and the subordinate "old left" enabled a 
marginalisation of other actors) to what can provisionally be defined as a 
"hegemony of openness" (in which the conflict between the dominant forces of 
disorganised capitalism and those of the subordinate "new left", or the counter 
culture, over the question of just how far openness and reflexivity are to be taken, 
defines the new stakes at issue, and marginalises other forces). This in turn creates 
the conditions of plausibility of post-structuralism and post-modernism. 
In other words, one of the key issues at stake in contemporary conflicts is precisely 
over the meanings of reflexivity and autonomy, and over whether they can form 
part of a new hegemony containing social conflict or whether they can be 
radicalised to the point of rupture. The conflicting meanings that can be attributed 
to "individuality" (as possessive individualism or self-development), to "distance" (as 
an instrumental orientation of exploitation and domination (Williams 1985) or a 
reflexive strategy of not taking socially-defined goals for granted) and to "change" 
(as modernisation and rationalisation imposed from above or as the micro-politics 
of social transformation from below) are then key stakes of the politics of hegemony 
and counter-hegemony. 
George McKay, in his important new book (1996), asks at several points why the 
Thatcher and Major r駩mes have adopted such a brutal strategy to destroy the free 
festival scene, the New Traveller lifestyle, rave culture and so on, and points out the 
paradox that these groups are among the most "enterprising" representatives of 
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Footnotes 
(1) I want to thank the participants for the interviews this paper is based on, and 
Hilary Tovey and Anna Mazzoldi for their comments on earlier drafts. 
(2) This might already be suggested by the two examples of lifeworld reflexivity 
given above: that associated with 1968 and that associated with "New Age" 
management strategies, however hideous the latter's reading of reflexivity. 
(3) On a related note, Michael Taylor has argued that the "secular family commune" 
is unique among communities "in the degree to which community and autonomy 
are together valued, sought after, and in some instances successfully achieved in 
practice [...] [T]here is a more tentative acceptance of organisational forms and 
codes of behaviour, which are submitted to more critical evaluation and are 
modified by processes of mutual negotiation in which all participate as friends. To 
be sure, these features of the secular family communes are ideals; but many 
communes have gone a long way towards realising them in practice. They are all 
conducive to the achievement of autonomy." (1982: 160 - 164) 
(4) I am indebted in particular to Bronislaw Szerszynski for his comments on the 
1996 paper. 
(5) In this and subsequent quotes names have been changed to protect the innocent. 
(6) This was Berger, Berger and Kellner's interpretation of the counter culture: "The 
implicit anthropology in all of this is quite clear: Underneath the constraining 
structures of individuality and rationality lies the healing reality of our 'natural' 
being, an ens realissimum, which is the object of a quasi-soteriological quest." 
(1974: 182). This is not the position taken by most participants, who are familiar 
with the romantic rhetoric of much Sixties literature, but largely fail to adopt it for 
themselves. 
(7) Thompson 1972 and Earle et al. 1994. 
(8) Thompson 1980, Thompson 1988, Wolfe 1969. 
(9) Stevens 1989. 
(10) I have developed one form of this argument in Cox (forthcoming); other 
approaches can be found in Bey (1991) and McKay (1996). The phrase "free space" 
is quite widely used, particularly in the context of anarchist projects and of squats 
or occupations. 
 
